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Do Fiscal Shocks Explain Bond Yield in High and Low Debt Economies 
 
Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to explore determinants of short-, medium- and long-run bond yields 
through time series data analysis for 11 developed countries, with five of them being high-debt 
and remaining as the low-debt economies. By applying variance decomposition using structural 
vector autoregression (SVAR) model, empirical findings confirm an important role of demand and 
supply factors that drive the interest rates across their frequency spectrum. Our results also 
highlight that for interest rates of different maturities, these factors exhibit heterogeneous behavior 
across high- and low-debt countries during the pre- and post-crisis regimes.  
Keywords: Interest rates; demand and supply shocks; SVAR model. 
JEL Classification: E43; G12; C23.  
 
1. Introduction 
 The impact of fiscal policy on the interest rates of developed economies during the global 
financial crisis of 2008-09 has increased attention of the researchers and policy makers on the 
nexus between fiscal and monetary policy variables. The European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC) 
2010-12 in relevance to certain European Monetary Union (EMU) member countries, i.e. Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain also led to the resurgence of debate on the effects of 
fiscal policy on economic activity. The convergence in interest rates which existed across the 
developed economies prior to such crises disappeared with the onset of these crises periods, 




Sola, 2013). Fiscal shocks can expose an economy to sudden changes in liquidity and interest rates 
with implications for many other sectors in the economy. Large fiscal deficits could adversely 
affect the soundness of domestic policy, economic activity (Afonso, 2010) and reduce national 
savings, unless offset by an increase in private savings. A fall in national savings, in turn, could 
lead to a fall in national investment and national income, assuming that other factors remain 
constant (Gale & Orszag, 2004). Large fiscal deficits can also discourage private sectors economic 
activity, by crowding out private investments (Fischer & Easterly, 1990) and reduce both 
households’ wealth and their consumption levels (Engen & Hubbard, 2004). 
This work is based on highlighting the impact of fiscal shocks on bond yields with different 
maturities, i.e. short-, medium- and long-run represented by 3-months, 5-years and 10-years, 
respectively. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between fiscal shocks and interest rates 
represented by US bonds with different maturities for two different set of sampling countries 
representing high- and low-debt economies. Fiscal shocks are explained by using total factor 
productivity (estimated from Cobb-Douglas production function), tax rates, government 
expenditures, and interest rates on US government securities. All these four variables are used in 
the framework proposed Kilian and Park (2009) and used by Caporale et al. (2011) for generating 
fiscal shocks. Later, these generated fiscal shocks explain the variance in interest rates with varying 
maturities. Therefore, our work is comprised of two sections, as follows. 
- First, it identifies important variables based on theoretical justifications for generating 
fiscal shocks. This is done using a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model 
proposed by Kilian and Park (2009) and following the work by Caporale et al. (2011) for 




- Second, it employs the forecasting variance decomposition methodology to account for the 
share of variation from endogenous variables and their transmission to all other variables 
within the system, attributable to the dynamic nature of the VAR model. It further applies 
forecasting variance decompositions across different forecasting horizons, i.e. 7, 14, 21, 28 
and 35 years for both the developed and the developing economies.   
Overall, the goal of this paper is to investigate how the uncertainty associated with fiscal 
policy, i.e. government expenditure and tax revenues, can affect interest rates in a group of 
eleven countries, comprising of high and low debt countries. These countries include Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, 
spanning the period 1980-2015. Our study, while strongly associated with the previous 
literature, differs in the following respect. The previous literature does not capture the financial 
crisis period of 2008-09, nor does it take a comparative approach – e.g. high debt versus low 
debt economies - to investigate the effect of fiscal shocks on interest rates. Thus, we aim to 
address the following questions: 
(1) How do fiscal shocks affect interest rates in the sample of selected countries? 
(2) How different is the impact of fiscal shocks on interest rates in high and low debt 
economies? 
The second question is of particular importance in light of the significant fiscal shocks faced by 
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008-
09. The empirical analysis makes use of the structural VAR (SVAR) methodological approach, 
which allows us to decompose the effects of the contribution of shocks generated by each variable, 




et al., 2007). The decomposition tests not only identify significance of each factor across the 
countries under investigation but also provide useful and insight information about the 
determinants of interest rates. Our methodology does not run conventional regressions (given that 
the VAR methodological approach is based on a simultaneous system of equations where the 
dependent variables just depends on the lagged values of a number of drivers). Therefore, future 
research that needs to employ a modelling approach with the identification of drivers of interest 
rates for countries in our sample, will substantially benefit from our findings. In this sense, 
identification of such factors could assist researchers to detect the future course of credit default 
risk of a country, as a way to provide a fundamentals-based surveillance tool which can potentially 
serve as an early warning device.     
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature, while section 
3 presents methodological aspects along with the data used for empirical analysis. Section 4 
presents empirical findings. Finally, section 5 concludes our work. 
2. Literature review 
 According to the Keynesian School, an increased demand generated by a fiscal expansion 
pushes up the interest rates and leads to an increase in income. In the long run, however, the 
Classical hypothesis holds, with a fiscal expansion not influencing an economic activity (Faini, 
2006). According to the Ricardian Equivalence axiom, there is an absence of crowding out under 
specific assumptions. Private savings completely offsets the effect of higher public consumption 
for a given level of taxes (Barro, 1974). Alternatively, fiscal deficits need not to be financed only 
by domestic sources, but also by capital inflows (Balassa, 1988). The effect of a fall in the budget 




as the effects this policy has on both exchange and interest rates. A fiscal contraction accompanied 
by a loose monetary policy is expected to lead towards reduced interest rates, causing exchange 
rate depreciations and thus, leading to increases in the private investments and a fall in the trade 
deficit (Fischer & Easterly, 1990).  
          Turning to the empirical literature, some studies show that governments maintaining high 
fiscal deficits rely substantially on financial markets to finance these deficits (Ford & Laxton, 
1999; Reinhart & Sack, 2000; Canzoneri et al., 2002; Gale & Orszag, 2004; Laubach, 2009; 
Afonso, 2010; Dell’Erba & Sola, 2013). Reinhart and Sack (2000) in a study of the effects of fiscal 
policy on interest rates in a group of OECD countries, observe that an increase in the budget deficit 
of the countries under study, lead to higher interest rates. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) employ a 
SVAR methodology to investigate the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity. Their findings 
document that government spending shocks have a positive effect on both output and consumption, 
and a negative effect on investment. Similarly, Canzoneri et al. (2002) use a SVAR methodological 
approach to illustrate the presence of a strong and statistically significant link between fiscal 
deficits and medium- and long-term interest rates. They find that positive expenditure shocks lead 
to an increase in interest rates, while Fatás and Mihov (2001) find, through a similar SVAR 
methodological approach, a significant positive effect of fiscal expansions on economic activity. 
Arguing along the same lines, Laubach (2009) observes that government deficits have a 
statistically significant effect on interest rates. In particular, a unit point increase in the expected 
budget deficit-to-GDP ratio is projected to raise long-term interest rates by approximately 25 to 30 
basis points. Feldstein (1986) argues that it is future and not current budget deficits which affect 
interest rates. Gale and Orszag (2004), similarly note that expected future budget deficits have a 




Young (1987), however, find that both current and future budget deficits affect interest rates in 
expectation of higher levels of debt financing. In a study of the effect of debt on interest rates in 
both the U.S. and the Euro area, Chinn and Frankel (2007) illustrate that the impact of real interest 
rates on government debt depends on the current as well as expected future levels of public debt 
in both areas. This finding, however, holds only when foreign interest rates are accounted for. 
Similar conclusions are reached by Faini (2006) in a study of the association between fiscal policy 
and interest rates in Europe. He finds that an expansionary fiscal policy in one EMU member 
country has effects, both on its spread and on the overall level of interest rates for the currency 
union. Ford and Laxton (1999) note that OECD public debt-to-GDP ratios have a significant 
impact on real interest rates in nine industrial countries and in a strong market integrated 
environment. Similarly, Dell’Erba and Sola (2013) use real-time data to investigate the impact of 
fiscal policy on long-term interest rates for a group of OECD countries. They show that over 60 
percent of the variation in long-term interest rates can be explained by both fiscal and monetary 
policy effects.    
Not all empirical studies, however, support this view. Makin (1983) and Dewald (1983) 
find only weak support for a positive association between budget deficits and interest rates. Evans 
(1985) similarly argues that large deficits do not necessarily lead to higher interest rates.  Similar 
findings are documented by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) who do not find any significant 
evidence of debt or deficits influencing world interest rates. Engen and Hubbard (2004) argue that 
while unsustainable levels of debt can be harmful to an economy, an increase in government debt 
of around one percent of GDP is likely to have only a small effect of about a 2-3 percent increase 
in real interest rates. 




3.1  Methodology 
 SVAR models are a multivariate, linear representation of a vector of observables on its 
own lags and (possibly) other variables, as well as a trend and/or a constant. SVAR modeling 
makes explicit identifying assumptions to isolate estimates of policy and/or private agents’ 
behavior and its effects on the economy, while keeping the model free of many additional 
restrictive assumptions needed to give every parameter a behavioral interpretation. Introduced by 
Sims (1980), SVARs have been used to document the effects of money on output (Sims & Zha, 
2005), the relative importance of supply and demand shocks on business cycles (Blanchard & 
Quah, 1989), the effects of fiscal policy (Blanchard & Perotti, 2002), or the relationship between 
technology shocks and worked hours (Galí, 1999), among many other applications.  
Our work diverges from existing literature on interest rate determinants as it adopts SVAR 
model by including an array of structural shocks with economic and theoretical interpretation of 
the sensitivity of interest rates. Though there are few studies investigating the impact of such 
structural shocks on exchange rate in emerging markets (Caporale et al., 2011), their impact on 
interest rates in countries with different economic conditions provides an avenue of research. We 
follow the work of Kilian and Park (2009) in introducing structural shocks to a VAR framework. 
Existing work documents the impact of factors like productivity, employment, private output, etc. 
on different macro-economic variables however our work investigates the impact of fiscal shocks 
employing SVAR model by including number of endogenous variables along with a constant and 
structural shock εt.”  
We consider wide range of structural shocks with a particular emphasis on fiscal 




process allows us to go one step ahead from merely explaining the dichotomy between supply 
(permanent) and demand (transitory) shocks. Following the work by Ahmed et al. (1993) and 
Hoffmaister and Roldos (2001), we rely on quasi-recursive identification criteria which is based 
on long-run restrictions in retrieving structural shocks that drive the system. Though existing 
literature documents ample evidence about the role of fiscal shocks on economic outputs (see 
Mountfort & Uhlig, 2009), the magnitude of such effects remains debatable, mainly because of 
the identification problems of fiscal disturbances. Though a strand of existing literature (Blanchard 
& Perotti, 2002; Mountford & Uhlig, 2005) address the identifying assumptions of VAR models, 
it represents limitation in i) anticipating the identified episodes and ii) the occurrence of substantial 
fiscal shocks with different signs and types around the same time. In our work, semi elasticities of 
fiscal variables to innovations in interest rates at different maturities are set to zero, following the 
work of De Castro & Fernández (2013) under the assumption that no interest payments are made 
on government debt. 
The SVAR modeling approach has been addressing the criticisms of the standard Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) modeling approach. This standard VAR methodology has been criticized 
on the grounds of its unrestricted tendency that permits the model to absorb too many parameters 
with no theoretical framework to verify the accuracy of the findings. To overcome that, the error 
term from a SVAR model is guided by restrictions that are adopted from economic theory. The 
model assumes that the error terms of the variables exhibit a recursive relationship. That is, the 
error terms in the regression are constructed to be uncorrelated to each other. As presented by 
Verheyen (2010), the SVAR model includes a number of endogenous variables, a constant and a 
structural shock εt: 




To derive the reduced form of the model, we multiply the above equation by the inverse of B to 
get:  
 Yt = Γ0 + Γ1 yt-1 + μt         (2) 
where yt denotes the variables in the system: (i) total factor productivity, (ii) tax revenues, (iii) 
government expenditures, and (iv) interest rates. They are all described further in the data section; 
Γ0 is C0B-1, while Γ1 stands for C1 B-1 and μt represents B-1εt. The model allows certain n(n-1)/2 
restrictions to be imposed on the parameter matrix B, which is defined as a function of structural 
shocks given by: 
 εt = Bμt          (3) 
The starting point of our analysis is a SVAR model specified as in (2). Structural innovations are 
derived by imposing exclusion restrictions on 𝐴𝐴0−1 in 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴0−1 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 , where 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 is a vector of errors in 
SVAR framework (Kilian & Park, 2009): 
         𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴0−1𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿)𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝐴0−1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡                                                       (4) 
In particular, the four aforementioned structural shocks are classified as follows: 𝜀𝜀1𝑡𝑡 denotes total 
factor productivity shocks, 𝜀𝜀2𝑡𝑡 represents tax revenue shocks, 𝜀𝜀3𝑡𝑡 captures government expenditure 
shocks,  whereas 𝜀𝜀4𝑡𝑡 denotes interest rate shocks. The identification of 𝐴𝐴0−1 in Eq. (2) is achieved 

















𝑎𝑎11         0          0      0 
𝑎𝑎21      𝑎𝑎22      0      0
𝑎𝑎31     𝑎𝑎32    𝑎𝑎33    0




















The identifying restrictions in the model presented above work on the assumption that total factor 
productivity does not respond to changes in taxes, government expenditure and interest rate shocks 
in the comparative short span of time i.e., within months (Blanchard & Quah 1989). The effects of 
the fiscal shock on taxes, spending, and interest rates will differ depending on the path, the 
government decides to take (Favero & Giavazzi 2007). Therefore, we assume that government 
taxes respond to shocks in total factor productivity and taxes shocks only, while they are not 
sensitive to expenditures and interest rate shocks (Easterly & Rebelo, 1993; Folster & Henrekson, 
2001). Following that in the third case, government expenditures are sensitive to total factor 
productivity, taxes and government expenditure shocks, but they are insensitive to interest rate 
shocks. Finally, interest rates are sensitive to all four shocks discussed above, recommending that 
any exogenous shocks in either of the four indicators i.e., total factor productivity, tax, government 
expenditures and interest rates shocks, are reflected onto interest rates (Dell’Erba & Sola 2013, 
Canzoneri et al. 2002). 
  3.2   Data 
 The analysis makes use of annual data1, spanning the period 1980 to 2015. Total factor 
productivity is calculated using a Cobb-Douglas production function. However, to calculate total 
factor production, data of gross domestic product for each sample country is used. Tax rates 
represent the amount of taxes along mandatory contributions payable by businesses after allowable 
deductions and exemptions, as a share of commercial profit. However, taxes withheld or remitted 
to various tax authorities are not included. Government expenditures consist of cash payments 
 
1 GDP for all the sampling countries is measured in terms of local currency. Government expenditures represent general government 
final consumption expenditures also measured in local currency. Taxes variable include taxes along mandatory contributions 
payable by businesses after allowable deductions and exemptions, as a share of commercial profit. Finally, interest rates represent 




made in providing goods and services. It also includes employee’s compensation, grants, rents and 
dividends, subsidies and interests and social benefits. Finally, interest rates represent rates on 
government securities. We select interest rates based on three different maturities for each country 
comprising of 3-months, 5-years and 10-years maturity corresponding to short-, medium- and 
long-term yields. Data for all the variables is sourced from World Bank Development (WDI) 
indicators. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics not only for the overall sample of countries under 
study, but also for both low-debt and high-debt countries. High-debt countries are characterized 
not only by their higher mean vis-à-vis the low-debt countries, but also by higher standard 
deviation.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1      Preliminary Results 
Table 2 reports unit root tests results. In general, unit root tests cannot distinguish highly 
persistent stationary processes from non-stationary processes. Also, the power of unit root tests 
diminishes as deterministic terms are added to the test regressions. That is, tests that include a 
constant and trend in the test regression have less power than tests that only include a constant in 
the test regression. For maximum power against very persistent alternatives, we use the test 
proposed by Elliot et al. (1996). In particular, they introduce a potentially more powerful unit root 
test, that is, the generalized least squares version of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and 




deterministic components (mean or trend) are included in the data generating process. The null 
hypothesis is that there is a unit root in the series. We reject the null hypothesis of the presence of 
a unit root when the test statistic is less than the corresponding critical value. Based on the findings 
reported in Table 2, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all four variables and 
across all sampled countries. These findings suggest that our variables are non-stationary in levels, 
while the results in first differences illustrate that a unit root is rejected. The results remain robust 
across all countries under study. Thus, for these countries, cointegration tests can be used to check 
the presence of linear combination since variables in a model for each country are non-stationary 
and integrated of order one. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 reports Johansen’s (1995) maximum likelihood cointegration tests. Following Hoffman et 
al. (1995), we allow for linear deterministic time trends in vector moving-average (in level form) 
representation of the model, which in turn implies an unrestricted constant and no deterministic 
time trends in the Vector Error Correction Modeling (VECM) specification. Chao and Phillips 
(1999) have drawn attention to a potential problem with Johansen’s method of performing 
sequential tests to determine the cointegration rank. Johansen’s (1992) Theorem 2 shows that the 
probability of overestimating the rank remains positive in the limit and, therefore, the cointegration 
rank is not estimated consistently with the sequential procedure. Furthermore, the VECM of 
Johansen requires in general to choose an appropriate lag order and results can be sensitive to lag 
misspecification. Chao and Phillips have proposed to apply the Posterior Information Criterion 
(PIC) of Phillips and Ploberger (1996) to VECMs as an alternative to Johansen’s method. This 
criterion allows the determination of the VECM lag order and the cointegration rank jointly and 




length obtained for each country based on the Akaike Informational Criterion (AIC). The findings 
document that in the cases of Greece, Portugal and Spain the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level. By contrast, in the remaining cases the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration can be strongly rejected at the 5% significance level.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Variance decompositions account for the share of variations resulting from the endogenous 
variables and the transmission to all other variables in the system, because of the dynamic nature 
of the VAR. Variance decompositions, also known as innovation accounting, offer a workable 
option for describing the dynamic relationship between variables that either share long-run 
relationships (Refalo, 2009) or not long-run relationships. Table 4 explains the variations of 
extracted shocks on original variables across certain forecasting horizons, i.e. 7, 14, 21, 28 and 35 
years, when the 3-month interest rates on public debt are used. Original variables not only include 
dependent variable of interest (i.e. interest rate) but the complete set of all the variables. The 
findings of Table 4 show that in the case of the high-debt countries, the following results can be 
highlighted:  
i) In the cases of Cyprus and Spain, the interest rates can be substantially explained by 
the forecasting variance of tax revenues. In both cases, supply shocks tend to drive 
interest rates as opposed to demand shocks. 
ii) In the cases of Greece and Ireland, the interest rates can be significantly explained by 
the forecasting variance of government expenses. In both countries, demand shocks are 




iii) In the case of Italy, it is the forecasting variance of productivity that seems to highly 
explain interest rates. Supply and demand shocks seem to equally drive interest rates, 
though supply shocks lightly dominate the influence. 
iv) Finally, in the case of Portugal, only the own forecasting variable seems to be the main 
driver for interest rates. Demand shocks are the exclusive driver of interest rates.  
Table 4 also displays the forecasting variance decompositions for the low-debt countries. In 
particular: 
i) In Australia, forecasting productivity variance is the main determinants of interest rates. 
Both demand and supply shock equally drive interest rates. 
ii) In the case of Canada, the forecasting variance of government expenses seems to be the 
primary driver of interest rates, followed by total factor productivity shocks. In this 
country, the demand shocks highly dominate the supply shocks in driving interest rates. 
iii) In Denmark, tax revenues forecasting variance seems to drive interest rates. In this case 
demand shocks again substantially explain interest rates. 
iv) Finally, in the cases of New Zealand and Norway, supply shocks, i.e. total factor 
productivity, seem to be a very significant factor in explaining interest rates forecasting 
variance.  
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
Tables 5 and 6 also report variance decompositions, but this time with respect to the 5-year and 
10-year yields, respectively. In particular, in terms of the 5-year yields, the findings highlight a 
very close picture: in terms of the high-debt countries, total factor productivity shocks seem to 




shared with that of government expenses. In Spain, it is government expenditures that continue to 
drive the course of those yields. In other words, the majority of high-debt countries indicate that 
the course of the yields on their government bonds is driven by supply factors and not by demand 
(i.e., government expenses or taxes) factors, indicating the inability of the competitiveness of their 
economy to support high deficits, which is reflected on higher yields, while supporting that the 
deficits themselves are not the driving force for those yields. These results are also supported in 
the two cases (i.e., Portugal and Spain) where demand factors play their role in driving government 
bond yields and therefore, we are inclined to argue that changes in fiscal performances seem to 
affect these yields through their effect on perceived default risk, as these high-debt countries are 
considered low credit worthy. In the case of low-debt countries, the picture is similar to that 
reported in Table 4 and shows that it is fiscal measures (i.e., government expenses and taxes) that 
are the primary driver of government bonds yields. Only if these countries disturb their fiscal 
environment, then they will experience changes in those yields. Finally, in terms of the 10-year 
(long-term) bonds, though the results for the high-debt countries remain close to those presented 
in Table 5, in the majority of the cases (except in the cases of Greece and Ireland), the explanation 
comes from the interest rates themselves. A similar picture emerges for the case of low-debt 
countries. 
[Insert Tables 5-6 about here] 
4.2 The role of the 2008 financial crisis 
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), the 2008 financial crisis contributed massively to the 
sovereign debt crisis experienced by a number of Eurozone countries, such as Cyprus, Greece, 




given that they were unable to finance their large government deficits and came close to default). 
At the same time, Bordo (2015) claims that the Eurozone sovereign debt (fiscal) crisis) was the 
culmination of the participating countries’ significant financial interconnections which evolved 
along with both the strong forces of financial globalization and their ideology for backing up the 
necessity for public policymakers to socialize any income losses because of the financial crises 
occurred earlier. Therefore, this part of the empirical analysis repeats the above variance 
decomposition procedure by splitting the time sample over the periods prior to and after the 2008 
financial crisis. The new results for the 3-month, 5-year and 10-year government bond yields are 
reported in Tables 7, 8 and 9, respectively.  
Across all three cases, these findings highlight the presence of a different picture across the 
two regimes. For instance, in the case of Greece, the driving force for the 3-month interest rates 
prior to the crisis event was a demand factor (taxes), while over the post-crisis regime the driving 
force was a supply driver (total factor productivity). For both the 5- and 10-year yields, however, 
it was this supply factor that determined the course of both yields. Again, in the case of Ireland for 
3-month yields, the supply driver over the pre-crisis period turned into a demand driver over the 
post-crisis regime, while for the remaining yields, supply factors remained as the dominant drivers.  
          Finally, for the case of the low debt countries the most characteristics findings are in 
relevance to the case of Canada where for 3-month and 5-year yields, it is government expenses 
(a demand factor) that dominates yields variance forecasting, while for the 10-year bond yields it 
is the self-forecasting variance that seems to dominate the results. Another characteristic example 
is that of Denmark where for the 5-year interest rates while no factor seemed to primarily explain 
variance decompositions for bond yields over the pre-crisis period, it was both supply and demand 




year interest rates over both regimes, it is the self-explanatory power of those yields that was 
driving those decomposition changes.  
           Values of forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD’s) of interest rates are presented 
with different forecasting horizons. We present these FEVD’s for different maturities of yields i.e. 
short medium and long term. We report complete sample from 1980-2015 with the forecasting 
horizons of 7, 14, 21, 28 and 35 with equal slab of 7 years to measure short- to long-run variations 
(see Tables 4-6). As we also aim to check the pre- and post-financial crisis period, and then divide 
the complete period into pre- and post-crisis with the spacing of 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 pre-crisis period 
and 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 post crisis period to again check the short- and long-run variation in yield (see 
Tables 7-9).  
[Insert Tables 7-9 about here] 
In order to provide a comparison of the empirical findings reported in Tables 7 to 9, we first 
estimate the individual covariances ratios for each country, calculated as: 2Cov (residuals of 
country i with residuals of country j)/Variance of residuals of country i) and then we get the sum 
of those ratios. The results are reported in Table 10 and clearly document that the ratio with respect 
to high debt vs the low debt countries is positive, indicating that positive (negative) news coming 
from the proxies of interest rate determinants decrease (increase) interest rates for the case of high 
debt countries. Next, in terms of the low debt countries and with respect to the period before and 
after the crisis, the ratio turns out to be negative, indicating that news coming from these proxies 
decrease interest rates. In other words, low debt countries seem not to experience a severe adverse 
effect to interest rates from shocks originated in the real economy due to the presence of the 




before and after the crisis, the ratio turns out to be positive, indicating that news coming from these 
proxies increase interest rates, implying that low debt countries seem to experience a severe 
adverse effect to interest rates from shocks originated in the real economy due to the presence of 
the financial crisis. The findings remain consistently similar across all interest rates maturities. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines how fiscal policy shocks can affect interest rates in a group of high and low 
debt countries over the period 1980-2015 using an SVAR methodology. We investigate the impact 
of fiscal shocks on interest rates in high and low debt countries, and the role of the 2008 financial 
crisis in the link between fiscal shocks and interest rates. Although the paper focused on interest 
rates across both short- and in the long-run, the findings concerning the long-run government 
interest rates are highly significant for monetary policy makers, since it is the use of these rates 
that really matters for monetary policy (Seyfried, 2009; Roskelley, 2016). 
      The empirical findings suggest that both demand and supply factors influence interest rates 
across their frequency spectrum. For majority of the high-debt countries, the yields on their 
government bonds is driven mainly by the supply side factors and not by the demand side (i.e., 
government expenses or taxes) factors. In the case of Portugal and Spain, demand factors play a 
role in driving government bond yields. Here, changes in fiscal performance appears to influence 
yields through their effect on perceived default risk, as these high-debt countries are considered to 




expenses and taxes) appear as the main driver of government bonds yields. The results also indicate 
that for interest rates of certain maturities, these factors could be different across high- and low-
debt countries and across the pre- and post-crisis regimes.  
Future research venues could be the extension of those results for other country groups, 
especially from the emerging and developing countries territories, while we could also explore the 
likelihood of non-linear relationships between fiscal measures, i.e. government debt, and interest 
rates, in a sense that as government debt continues to increase, the credibility of fiscal sustainability 
decreases, leading to rapid increases in interest rates. Furthermore, any future empirical attempt 
could account for some factors that can likely contribute to the temporary deviation of sovereign 
borrowing costs from their long-run equilibrium level in the aftermath of the crisis. For instance, 
uncertainties related to the feedback effects between banks and sovereigns and the contingent 
liabilities of the public sector. Finally, given that the economies of certain (mostly small) countries 
are affected by economic conditions in large countries, especially when they have large capital 
flows or trading with these countries, the future empirical analysis could also consider both 
domestic and international (control) macroeconomic variables to explain the course of interest 
rates due to fiscal changes. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 









High Debt Country Sample 
Cyprus       
Minimum -3.4961 23.2707 0.1205 1.7383 3.9317 3.3208 
Maximum 5.8078 69.2357 0.1904 52.5600 20.3200 19.5600 
Mean 1.0770 46.8694 0.1610 25.1359 11.0643 9.6453 
Std. dev.  2.0278 14.7488 0.0171 19.6273 5.8543 5.2736 
Skewness -0.0385 -0.3633 -0.3127 0.1863 0.1480 0.5231 
Kurtosis 0.1364 -1.0781 -0.4795 -1.6754 -1.5648 -1.1177 
Greece       
Minimum -9.4683 17.9315 0.1563 -0.0194 3.5850 3.5850 
Maximum 2.6218 22.7616 0.2331 26.3200 22.4975 22.4975 
Mean -0.9054 19.9729 0.1870 12.1974 8.8931 8.7005 
Std. dev.  2.5458 1.3360 0.0188 9.7379 3.8711 3.8096 
Skewness -1.0582 0.4940 0.4858 0.1163 1.1992 1.3612 
Kurtosis 1.8442 -0.4484 -0.3712 -1.5584 2.4630 3.0198 
Ireland       
Minimum -4.9401 20.0571 0.1471 -0.0191 2.1201 1.1131 
Maximum 5.7672 33.2772 0.2222 14.9502 17.2682 17.2682 
Mean 1.3253 24.7703 0.1803 6.5653 7.8473 7.8193 
Std. dev.  2.3554 4.0624 0.0214 4.9384 4.1524 4.1954 
Skewness -0.4475 1.1225 0.5145 0.3485 0.7606 0.7115 
Kurtosis 0.2262 0.1632 -0.7402 -1.2812 -0.3603 -0.3552 
Italy       
Minimum -3.9535 20.3400 0.1659 -0.0194 3.5554 1.7140 
Maximum 2.8683 24.2523 0.2062 19.9053 19.6500 21.5900 
Mean -0.1012 22.1027 0.1880 7.8108 9.8269 8.2696 
Std. dev.  1.4725 0.9610 0.0090 6.2295 5.9671 4.5090 
Skewness -0.0753 0.3496 -0.2331 0.4251 0.4230 0.7157 
Kurtosis 0.5857 -0.0460 -0.4777 -1.1195 -1.5160 0.0782 
Portugal       
Minimum -3.2878 18.7820 0.1272 -0.0194 3.1500 0.8100 
Maximum 4.8877 20.9076 0.2143 19.9053 12.9500 10.5900 
Mean -0.6202 20.0766 0.1736 7.8108 7.6488 5.0792 
Std. dev.  1.6693 0.6050 0.0280 6.2295 3.0962 2.7090 
Skewness 0.8535 -0.6794 -0.4335 0.4251 0.0709 0.4504 
Kurtosis 1.6312 -0.4969 -1.2227 -1.1195 -1.5041 -0.7728 
Spain       
Minimum -1.8196 7.1619 0.1363 -0.0194 0.0900 1.7351 
Maximum 1.9342 15.8890 0.2052 20.0496 16.1200 16.9092 
Mean -0.6094 12.8197 0.1717 7.6713 6.4908 8.5327 
Std. dev.  0.8361 2.7303 0.0181 6.0996 5.0942 4.7794 
Skewness 1.3504 -0.5312 0.2361 0.3547 0.4722 0.3837 
Kurtosis 1.9326 -0.8256 -0.6610 -1.3213 -1.0031 -1.3505 
Low Debt Country Sample 
Australia       
Minimum -1.9813 0.1711 0.1710 2.2558 2.0000 2.7108 
Maximum 2.3574 24.8531 0.1890 17.6117 13.9200 15.3750 
Mean 0.0182 11.1451 0.1784 8.1390 7.3364 8.3322 
Std. dev.  1.2936 11.7976 0.0053 4.6320 3.7680 3.8247 
Skewness 0.2316 0.1318 0.6363 0.7434 0.5018 0.4158 
Kurtosis -1.2039 -1.9577 -0.4950 -0.8675 -1.2631 -1.3021 
Canada       
Minimum -2.3650 11.4555 0.1902 0.6938 0.2455 1.5217 
Maximum 1.4767 14.9425 0.2437 18.3756 18.9643 14.9892 
Mean -0.3915 13.5356 0.2124 6.0987 5.6507 6.9611 
Std. dev.  1.0596 1.1083 0.0142 4.4783 4.3437 3.6703 
Skewness -0.0663 -0.6254 0.2520 0.8021 0.9301 0.4422 
Kurtosis -0.9868 -0.7681 -0.6140 -0.0519 0.6024 -0.7514 





Minimum -4.2656 28.6398 0.2305 -0.1242 -0.2100 0.6908 
Maximum 4.7055 34.8764 0.2806 16.5650 13.6900 12.6500 
Mean -0.2623 31.4862 0.2509 6.6832 6.2723 6.7660 
Std. dev.  1.8660 1.8048 0.0128 5.0843 4.6021 3.6460 
Skewness 0.1760 0.0256 0.7319 0.4719 0.0641 0.1019 
Kurtosis 0.5614 -0.8528 -0.7008 -1.1152 -1.4972 -1.3066 
New Zealand       
Minimum -3.7596 27.8469 0.1663 2.6567 2.3400 3.4233 
Maximum 3.2911 32.0150 0.1989 23.3050 22.7400 17.6575 
Mean -0.0929 29.6473 0.1810 9.1746 9.0419 8.5519 
Std. dev.  1.6645 1.4748 0.0106 5.5369 6.0699 3.8873 
Skewness -0.1055 0.2225 0.2352 0.8548 0.8117 0.7686 
Kurtosis -0.0353 -1.3214 -1.1680 -0.1548 -0.6426 -0.5922 
Norway       
Minimum -4.3803 25.7806 0.1790 1.2907 0.8100 1.5650 
Maximum 3.7264 28.9390 0.2197 15.3667 22.9400 13.4800 
Mean 0.3650 27.2335 0.2049 7.3702 7.5678 7.4166 
Std. dev.  2.0214 0.9334 0.0120 4.5807 5.2974 3.8880 
Skewness -0.2674 0.0586 -0.5860 0.3110 0.7591 0.3189 
Kurtosis -0.7766 -0.8114 -0.8426 -1.3700 0.1988 -1.3169 
Note: * represents the rejection of null hypothesis of no correlation at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent and *** at 10 percent. 
 
Note: DF-GLS test statistics for null hypothesis of unit root process at levels and first differences are reported. D and DT represent unit root tests 
without and with trend, respectively. Critical values at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels with constant and without time trend are -2.635, 
-1.915 and -1.611, respectively. Critical values at 1, 5 and 10 percent with constant and a linear time trend are -4.963, -3.770 and -3.190, 





Table 2: Unit root tests 
 Total Factor  Tax revenues Government expenditures Interest rates 
           Levels      Levels 1
st Differences          Levels 1
st Differences         Levels 1
st Differences 
 D DT D DT D DT D DT D DT D DT D DT 
Cyprus 
 
-4.916 -5.608 -0.518 -3.564 -6.793 -6.730 -2.153 -2.867 -5.285 -5.717 -1.228 -4.431 -9.316 -7.038 
Greece 
 
-4.746 -5.009 -2.101 -2.668 -5.362 -5.326 -1.176 -2.273 -5.236 -6.693 -1.561 -1.522 -3.527 -4.101 
Ireland 
 
-3.003 -4.195 -1.921 -2.796 -5.547 -5.735 -1.153 -1.230 -4.645 -5.196 -2.133 -2.681 -6.377 -7.045 
Italy 
 
-4.382 -5.439 -2.562 -2.705 -7.697 -7.636 -1.324 -2.203 -3.299 -4.538 -1.641 -1.641 -4.802 -5.004 
Portugal 
 
-4.641 -5.079 -1.998 -4.943 -5.631 -7.156 -0.572 -0.989 -4.849 -5.237 -1.420 -3.310 -8.180 -9.805 
Spain 
 
-3.860 -3.977 -1.798 -3.033 -6.725 -6.573 -0.393 -2.520 -3.814 -3.860 -2.739 -3.001 -8.588 -8.822 
Australia 
 
-1.003 -3.735 -0.603 -1.921 -5.725 -5.756 
 
-2.705 -3.091 -4.035 -3.572 -1.438 -1.941 -0.149 -7.106 
Canada 
 
-3.316 -3.937 -1.193 -2.490 -3.894 -3.952 -2.238 -2.398 -4.223 -4.223 -2.265 -4.313 -0.056 -7.069 
Denmark 
 
-4.807 -5.251 -2.199 -2.537 -6.954 -7.030 -1.648 -2.005 -4.638 -5.179 -2.856 -3.269 -7.733 -8.703 
New Z. 
 
-4.644 -4.875 -4.396 -4.851 -6.016 -6.635 -1.386 -1.631 -4.265 -4.537 1.143 -2.721 -0.780 -1.865 
Norway 
 




Table 3: Johansen cointegration tests 
  Rank 
Lags  0 1 2 3 
















countries          
Cyprus 1 0.522* 53.005* 0.422* 27.938* 0.230  9.276 0.012 0.417 
Greece 1 0.533* 45.929*    0.284   20.071 0.166  8.720 0.072 2.534 
Ireland 2 0.628* 65.382* 0.462* 31.799* 0.200 10.709   0.088*   3.144* 
Italy 2 0.567* 50.921*    0.345 21.740 0.127  7.392   0.079*   2.805* 
Portugal 1 0.500* 45.687*    0.339 22.109 0.174  8.031 0.044 1.523 
Spain 1 0.445 43.842    0.307 23.811 0.248 11.346 0.047 1.644 
Low debt 
countries  
        
Australia 3 0.509* 56.885* 0.434* 32.686* 0.308 13.314 0.024 0.812 
Canada 2 0.617* 57.831*    0.416   25.221 0.172  6.927 0.015 0.517 
Denmark 2 0.465* 55.493* 0.422* 34.213*   0.273* 15.596*   0.131*   4.755* 
New Zealand 1 0.697* 80.543* 0.459* 39.999*   0.343* 19.143*   0.133*   4.866* 
Norway 1 0.495* 58.607* 0.452* 35.378*   0.253* 14.912*   0.137* 5.017* 
Note: Critical values for the trace test statistics at the 95 percent for rank 0, 1, 2, and 3 are 47.856, 29.797, 15.495 and 3.841 







































7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.0612 10.5230 2.3176 84.0983 
 21 2.1988 9.4429 3.6364 84.7219 
 28 1.7830 8.4005 5.8534 83.9633 
 35 1.6558 7.8853 6.3289 84.1300 
Greece 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 12.2304 6.8206 1.0856 79.8634 
 21 11.9068 15.7780 6.2149 66.1003 
 28 15.3961 20.1068 8.9394 55.5578 
 35 17.6733 20.0250 11.1015 51.2002 
Ireland 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.9629 4.2131 3.8015 91.0226 
 21 4.6897 5.6546 4.1745 85.4815 
 28 7.2793 8.3550 3.6141 80.7519 
 35 9.8958 10.0587 3.7780 76.2675 
Italy 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 2.2484 1.3162 6.7551 89.6804 
 21 2.7898 12.0846 10.9599 74.1658 
 28 2.7115 15.9273 11.6028 69.7585 
 35 3.4102 16.3714 14.6748 65.5438 
Portugal 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 2.3070 0.4108 0.2002 97.0822 
 21 5.2026 3.8057 4.9884 86.0034 
 28 6.1372 6.7088 7.4462 79.7080 
 35 5.5493 8.8706 9.1749 76.4054 
Spain 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 5.2499 1.0172 6.4464 87.2867 
 21 4.7126 1.5068 9.3245 84.4562 
 28 3.6003 1.4031 10.2772 84.7196 
 35 3.3372 1.6259 9.0577 85.9792 
Australia 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 5.9751 0.0167 2.4645 91.5438 
 21 5.8444 0.4456 2.0586 91.6516 
 28 4.7926 0.7407 2.5271 91.9398 
 35 4.5078 1.7210 8.7509 85.0204 
Canada 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.3263 4.5380 11.4413 82.6944 
 21 3.7885 6.3641 22.6600 67.1877 
 28 4.1932 5.6607 25.3064 64.8398 
 35 4.2545 5.6441 26.4117 63.6899 
Denmark 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.8278 0.4289 3.8782 93.8653 
 21 2.2778 3.7538 3.4034 90.5652 
 28 2.6349 5.3313 3.3884 88.6454 




Notes: Percentage contribution of each structural shock in explaining the historical variance of the interest rate. Second column 

















7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.1946 2.4225 1.8734 95.5097 
 21 2.8739 2.1979 2.1153 92.8131 
 28 5.2136 2.2718 2.1143 90.4005 
 35 5.1526 2.4012 2.2883 90.1581 
Norway 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0624 0.0866 0.4810 99.3701 
 21 0.8590 0.1317 0.6275 98.3820 
 28 1.0024 0.1512 0.8627 97.9839 





















7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 7.6380 0.9229 4.8515 86.5878 
 21 13.5740 4.4194 3.6324 78.3744 
 28 19.0327 4.3849 3.0500 73.5326 
 35 21.8905 4.1069 2.8658 71.1371 
Greece 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 19.1003 0.9385 1.9442 78.0172 
 21 29.7314 3.6668 3.5376 63.0642 
 28 28.4391 5.5300 7.4507 58.5804 
 35 28.9952 5.7143 8.2400 57.0505 
Ireland 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.7448 0.2141 0.8711 95.1700 
 21 5.5439 0.7218 0.6705 93.0640 
 28 6.0137 0.7650 1.0602 92.1614 
 35 6.4566 0.9065 0.9107 91.7264 
Italy 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.5115 11.6882 5.6775 82.1227 
 21 2.3117 11.4300 5.8510 80.4075 
 28 3.5106 11.1289 6.9357 78.4250 
 35 4.1754 10.9548 7.0137 77.8563 
Portugal 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.5949 0.4725 1.4857 94.4470 
 21 9.6961 1.1616 7.2669 81.8755 
 28 11.9480 1.2709 11.8608 74.9205 
 35 11.7064 1.2181 14.2964 72.7792 
Spain 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 5.5222 0.3039 1.9619 92.2121 
 21 4.6919 1.8386 9.2835 84.1862 
 28 6.2519 5.7942 15.3642 72.5898 
 35 5.4656 5.6257 19.6762 69.2327 
Australia 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.4388 1.7088 1.3970 96.4554 
 21 7.7810 2.4689 5.1626 84.5877 
 28 9.5495 2.2769 7.9634 80.2104 
 35 8.9464 4.6772 13.1948 73.1818 
Canada 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0777 5.8366 15.7137 78.3720 
 21 0.2243 4.1008 20.4626 75.2124 
 28 0.1964 3.3635 21.2442 75.1959 
 35 0.1837 3.5770 20.6594 75.5798 
Denmark 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.3296 8.9490 8.4364 79.2851 
 21 10.7888 13.7169 6.1829 69.3114 
 28 18.5057 13.1896 5.8439 62.4609 




Notes: Percentage contribution of each structural shock in explaining the historical variance of the interest rate. Second column 

























7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 4.5884 4.0772 5.4272 85.9072 
 21 6.9531 7.7785 5.7415 79.5271 
 28 7.0159 7.9265 6.7953 78.2625 
 35 7.0099 8.0349 6.9805 77.9748 
Norway 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.1191 0.1579 0.0312 99.6918 
 21 0.2832 0.3047 0.0594 99.3528 
 28 0.3140 0.2845 0.1432 99.2583 





















7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 2.0039 2.7759 2.1937 93.0266 
 21 1.5468 2.6434 1.7510 94.0589 
 28 1.7551 2.5037 1.3671 94.3743 
 35 1.4840 2.2225 1.4003 94.8934 
Greece 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 14.0787 0.5444 1.9198 83.4572 
 21 26.1043 1.5821 4.4337 67.8801 
 28 29.9623 2.7601 7.8124 59.4654 
 35 32.6520 2.8285 8.2855 56.2342 
Ireland 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.4234 1.2950 3.3577 91.9239 
 21 7.4135 3.3173 2.5307 86.7387 
 28 11.4636 2.9935 2.8731 82.6699 
 35 14.3961 3.0619 2.5931 79.9490 
Italy 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.0162 2.4539 0.3564 96.1736 
 21 2.8094 5.0637 4.0591 88.0679 
 28 3.6453 5.7909 6.5337 84.0303 
 35 4.6157 7.1155 9.2864 78.9826 
Portugal 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.9155 0.9627 0.7836 96.3383 
 21 1.9996 0.7455 1.3733 95.8817 
 28 1.5835 0.5872 3.6094 94.2199 
 35 1.2522 1.0143 5.7312 92.0024 
Spain 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.2149 5.1404 2.3203 92.3245 
 21 5.0099 9.0339 1.6656 84.2907 
 28 6.1484 8.8626 1.3774 83.6117 
 35 6.6365 10.0337 1.4556 81.8744 
Australia 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.1569 0.5944 0.1734 99.0755 
 21 0.5815 0.5507 0.2256 98.6423 
 28 0.5500 0.6411 0.2553 98.5537 
 35 0.6524 0.9598 1.1747 97.2134 
Canada 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.6315 2.9788 1.4436 93.9463 
 21 1.3039 5.1266 1.2896 92.2799 
 28 1.2791 5.1824 1.2372 92.3014 
 35 1.1371 4.9952 2.0383 91.8296 
Denmark 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.4828 7.4972 2.5501 86.4700 
 21 3.6523 6.6954 3.1172 86.5351 
 28 3.1204 6.2688 3.5033 87.1076 




Notes: Percentage contribution of each structural shock in explaining the historical variance of the interest rate. Second column 
























7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.1906 1.7402 1.2323 96.8370 
 21 3.2130 5.1373 0.9297 90.7201 
 28 5.1330 6.6731 1.0990 87.0950 
 35 4.9159 7.4392 1.0352 86.6098 
Norway 
 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.2274 5.7287 1.7219 92.3221 
 21 5.5642 4.8956 1.2852 88.2551 
 28 5.5529 5.3130 1.9060 87.2282 














Tax revenues Government 
 
Interest rates 
High debt countries      
Cyprus      
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 5.0071 9.9107 0.4060 84.6762 
 21 3.4923 7.7673 3.2652 85.4752 
 28 2.5120 6.4627 6.9262 84.0991 
 35 2.0146 5.6488 8.0100 84.3265 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.1152 11.1353 4.2292 83.5203 
 21 0.9053 11.1185 4.0076 83.9686 
 28 1.0540 10.3382 4.7805 83.8273 
 35 1.2969 10.1218 4.6478 83.9335 
Greece 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.8306 9.3932 0.8650 88.9111 
 21 5.0660 13.5292 0.4605 80.9443 
 28 11.1129 15.1004 0.3418 73.4449 
 35 14.8749 13.9433 0.3174 70.8643 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 23.6302 4.2480 1.3061 70.8156 
 21 18.7476 18.0268 11.9693 51.2563 
 28 19.6793 25.1132 17.5370 37.6706 
 35 20.4716 26.1067 21.8856 31.5360 
Ireland 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.8965 4.6643 7.2339 86.2053 
 21 6.6069 6.5353 6.4228 80.4351 
 28 10.7451 9.7920 5.1819 74.2810 
 35 15.3246 12.4681 5.3439 66.8633 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0292 3.7619 0.3690 95.8399 
 21 2.7724 4.7738 1.9261 90.5277 
 28 3.8134 6.9179 2.0462 87.2227 
 35 4.4669 7.6493 2.2121 85.6717 
Italy 
 
    0.0000 
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.0810 2.1010 11.7861 85.0319 
 21 0.7397 15.4784 17.2393 66.5427 
 28 1.4017 20.3377 17.4600 60.8007 
 35 3.5081 20.3566 22.0757 54.0596 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.4157 0.5314 1.7241 94.3288 
 21 4.8399 8.6908 4.6805 81.7888 
 28 4.0213 11.5169 5.7455 78.7163 






     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.6750 0.4904 0.0633 95.7712 
 21 3.3898 6.0392 8.6839 81.8872 
 28 3.5685 11.9913 13.0834 71.3568 
 35 2.6652 15.6044 16.7949 64.9355 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.9389 0.3311 0.3370 98.3930 
 21 7.0154 1.5722 1.2928 90.1195 
 28 8.7059 1.4262 1.8089 88.0591 
 35 8.4333 2.1368 1.5548 87.8752 
Spain 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 4.0116 0.0012 5.3732 90.6140 
 21 4.5872 1.7238 7.4344 86.2546 
 28 3.2632 1.2086 7.5347 87.9935 
 35 3.4048 1.9052 6.1612 88.5288 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 6.4881 2.0331 7.5196 83.9593 
 21 4.8379 1.2898 11.2146 82.6578 
 28 3.9373 1.5975 13.0196 81.4456 
 35 3.2696 1.3466 11.9542 83.4296 
Low debt countries      
Australia 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 9.4174 0.0031 0.2236 90.3560 
 21 8.5392 0.1858 0.2984 90.9766 
 28 6.9205 0.3851 1.2978 91.3967 
 35 6.7219 2.4904 9.5070 81.2806 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 2.5328 0.0303 4.7054 92.7315 
 21 3.1495 0.7053 3.8188 92.3264 
 28 2.6647 1.0962 3.7564 92.4828 
 35 2.2937 0.9516 7.9947 88.7600 
Canada 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0493 2.4521 13.3862 84.1123 
 21 5.2523 3.4639 25.7991 65.4848 
 28 5.4533 2.8712 29.1224 62.5532 
 35 4.7832 2.5179 32.0576 60.6413 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 2.6033 6.6238 9.4964 81.2765 
 21 2.3246 9.2642 19.5208 68.8905 
 28 2.9330 8.4502 21.4904 67.1263 
 35 3.7257 8.7703 20.7658 66.7383 
Denmark 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 




Notes: Percentage contribution of each structural shock in explaining the historical variance of the interest rate. Second column 











 21 2.4304 2.4473 3.9049 91.2174 
 28 2.4612 3.0872 3.7932 90.6584 
 35 2.2051 7.7856 4.8159 85.1935 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 2.7518 0.0490 3.1086 94.0907 
 21 2.1252 5.0602 2.9018 89.9129 
 28 2.8086 7.5754 2.9836 86.6323 
 35 3.9248 7.7407 3.5766 84.7579 
New Zealand 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.2356 1.3025 0.3067 98.1553 
 21 1.3046 1.7616 0.2259 96.7080 
 28 1.4587 2.2602 0.6147 95.6664 
 35 1.3371 2.8230 0.5378 95.3021 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.1536 3.5424 3.4400 92.8639 
 21 4.4431 2.6342 4.0046 88.9181 
 28 8.9684 2.2833 3.6139 85.1345 
 35 8.9680 1.9793 4.0388 85.0140 
Norway 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0923 0.0862 0.5588 99.2627 
 21 1.6931 0.0867 0.8689 97.3513 
 28 1.9758 0.1125 1.4266 96.4851 
 35 1.7072 0.1118 1.6668 96.5142 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0324 0.0869 0.4031 99.4775 
 21 0.0248 0.1767 0.3860 99.4126 
 28 0.0289 0.1898 0.2987 99.4826 














Tax revenues Government 
 
Interest rates 
High debt countries      
Cyprus      
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 15.0724 0.7371 7.1193 77.0712 
 21 27.0260 0.7703 4.8323 67.3714 
 28 37.7689 0.5610 3.5884 58.0818 
 35 43.6231 0.4698 3.0158 52.8913 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.2035 1.1086 2.5837 96.1042 
 21 0.1219 8.0684 2.4325 89.3773 
 28 0.2964 8.2088 2.5115 88.9833 
 35 0.1578 7.7439 2.7157 89.3827 
Greece 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 11.6042 0.5776 1.2204 86.5979 
 21 20.2534 4.0358 2.1580 73.5527 
 28 21.1741 6.6376 2.4818 69.7065 
 35 22.5389 6.8392 2.7353 67.8865 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 26.5964 1.2994 2.6679 69.4363 
 21 39.2094 3.2978 4.9172 52.5756 
 28 35.7040 4.4223 12.4195 47.4543 
 35 35.4515 4.5894 13.7447 46.2144 
Ireland 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.1491 0.0006 1.6632 98.1871 
 21 2.2327 0.8122 1.2190 95.7362 
 28 3.9361 0.8271 1.7203 93.5166 
 35 5.0737 1.1224 1.4453 92.3586 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 7.3404 0.4276 0.0790 92.1529 
 21 8.8550 0.6314 0.1220 90.3917 
 28 8.0913 0.7028 0.4000 90.8060 
 35 7.8394 0.6906 0.3760 91.0940 
Italy 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.2119 1.1016 1.5616 97.1248 
 21 3.0435 1.1235 2.5372 93.2958 
 28 5.3116 0.8877 3.2126 90.5881 
 35 6.6716 0.8012 3.5439 88.9834 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.8111 22.2748 9.7934 67.1206 
 21 1.5798 21.7364 9.1648 67.5191 
 28 1.7096 21.3701 10.6587 66.2617 






     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.6809 0.9411 2.1173 93.2607 
 21 3.0405 1.8286 11.6088 83.5222 
 28 2.4584 1.8946 20.5797 75.0674 
 35 2.2316 1.8067 25.5704 70.3912 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.5089 0.0038 0.8541 95.6332 
 21 16.3517 0.4946 2.9249 80.2288 
 28 21.4376 0.6471 3.1418 74.7735 
 35 21.1812 0.6294 3.0223 75.1671 
Spain 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 7.4333 0.5764 0.9258 91.0645 
 21 4.6092 0.4075 4.7285 90.2549 
 28 4.8253 0.7042 7.2242 87.2462 
 35 4.0889 1.1880 10.1418 84.5813 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.6111 0.0314 2.9979 93.3596 
 21 4.7746 3.2696 13.8385 78.1174 
 28 7.6785 10.8841 23.5041 57.9333 
 35 6.8422 10.0634 29.2105 53.8840 
Low debt countries      
Australia 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.8105 2.7177 2.3050 94.1667 
 21 0.9188 2.0378 6.2829 90.7605 
 28 0.9300 1.7695 9.8629 87.4377 
 35 1.0367 1.6918 13.3559 83.9157 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0671 0.6999 0.4890 98.7441 
 21 14.6431 2.9000 4.0422 78.4148 
 28 18.1690 2.7842 6.0638 72.9831 
 35 16.8560 7.6626 13.0336 62.4478 
Canada 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0777 5.8366 15.7137 78.3720 
 21 0.2243 4.1008 20.4626 75.2124 
 28 0.1964 3.3635 21.2442 75.1959 
 35 0.1837 3.5770 20.6594 75.5798 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0777 5.8366 15.7137 78.3720 
 21 0.2243 4.1008 20.4626 75.2124 
 28 0.1964 3.3635 21.2442 75.1959 
 35 0.1837 3.5770 20.6594 75.5798 
Denmark 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 




Notes: Percentage contribution of each structural shock in explaining the historical variance of the interest rate. Second column 











 21 1.3136 0.0987 0.4903 98.0973 
 28 1.4626 0.0928 0.8992 97.5453 
 35 1.6293 0.2194 1.1663 96.9850 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 5.8880 17.7825 16.7463 59.5832 
 21 20.2640 27.3351 11.8754 40.5255 
 28 35.5487 26.2864 10.7885 27.3764 
 35 39.3755 28.6491 10.5283 21.4471 
New Zealand 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.8810 5.3776 10.0617 80.6796 
 21 6.4431 6.4593 10.7178 76.3799 
 28 6.6458 5.4351 12.9003 75.0189 
 35 6.8100 4.7452 13.3042 75.1406 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 5.2958 2.7767 0.7927 91.1348 
 21 7.4630 9.0976 0.7651 82.6742 
 28 7.3859 10.4178 0.6902 81.5060 
 35 7.2098 11.3245 0.6567 80.8090 
Norway 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.1191 0.1579 0.0312 99.6918 
 21 0.2832 0.3047 0.0594 99.3528 
 28 0.3140 0.2845 0.1432 99.2583 
 35 0.3448 0.2968 0.1378 99.2205 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.1191 0.1579 0.0312 99.6918 
 21 0.2832 0.3047 0.0594 99.3528 
 28 0.3140 0.2845 0.1432 99.2583 














Tax revenues Government 
 
Interest rates 
High debt countries      
Cyprus      
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.5275 0.0067 0.6538 98.8120 
 21 0.5628 1.2541 0.5233 97.6598 
 28 0.9465 1.3233 0.4285 97.3017 
 35 0.8471 1.3875 0.3815 97.3839 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.4803 5.5451 3.7336 87.2410 
 21 2.5307 4.0326 2.9787 90.4579 
 28 2.5637 3.6840 2.3056 91.4467 
 35 2.1208 3.0575 2.4190 92.4028 
Greece 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.0807 0.0041 1.1302 97.7850 
 21 12.4451 0.1300 3.9316 83.4934 
 28 23.4102 1.4723 3.3890 71.7286 
 35 28.9840 1.4204 2.9334 66.6623 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 27.0766 1.0847 2.7094 69.1293 
 21 39.7634 3.0342 4.9357 52.2667 
 28 36.5143 4.0479 12.2357 47.2021 
 35 36.3199 4.2365 13.6376 45.8060 
Ireland 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 6.8468 2.5848 4.5503 86.0181 
 21 12.5789 5.4686 3.5414 78.4111 
 28 18.8148 4.7233 3.8556 72.6063 
 35 23.4004 4.4643 3.6284 68.5069 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0000 0.0052 2.1651 97.8297 
 21 2.2481 1.1659 1.5199 95.0661 
 28 4.1124 1.2636 1.8906 92.7334 
 35 5.3918 1.6594 1.5578 91.3911 
Italy 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.8943 4.8960 0.6491 93.5605 
 21 3.0612 10.0026 7.9733 78.9629 
 28 4.0995 11.4236 12.9302 71.5467 
 35 7.1105 11.1735 16.1538 65.5623 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.1380 0.0118 0.0636 98.7867 
 21 2.5576 0.1248 0.1448 97.1728 
 28 3.1910 0.1582 0.1371 96.5137 






     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 3.7544 0.3333 0.8974 95.0149 
 21 2.8294 0.3277 0.7571 96.0858 
 28 1.9430 0.2286 4.2109 93.6174 
 35 1.2840 1.1976 7.0611 90.4573 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0766 1.5920 0.6697 97.6617 
 21 1.1698 1.1632 1.9895 95.6774 
 28 1.2239 0.9458 3.0079 94.8223 
 35 1.2203 0.8310 4.4012 93.5474 
Spain 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.2046 8.0802 3.8734 87.8418 
 21 8.0632 13.6302 2.5291 75.7775 
 28 8.9257 13.5694 1.9809 75.5240 
 35 9.5223 14.8085 1.6456 74.0237 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.2252 2.2006 0.7671 96.8071 
 21 1.9566 4.4376 0.8021 92.8038 
 28 3.3711 4.1558 0.7739 91.6992 
 35 3.7506 5.2588 1.2655 89.7250 
Low debt countries      
Australia 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.2585 0.4506 0.0284 99.2625 
 21 1.0153 0.4033 0.1298 98.4515 
 28 0.9444 0.4928 0.2477 98.3151 
 35 1.1509 0.7353 1.6704 96.4435 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0552 0.7381 0.3183 98.8884 
 21 0.1477 0.6981 0.3214 98.8329 
 28 0.1556 0.7894 0.2628 98.7922 
 35 0.1538 1.1843 0.6789 97.9831 
Canada 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.6727 4.6928 1.0369 92.5976 
 21 1.3217 9.0297 1.1182 88.5304 
 28 1.1417 9.3914 1.0653 88.4016 
 35 1.0221 9.1057 0.9731 88.8991 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 1.5903 1.2647 1.8502 95.2948 
 21 1.2861 1.2235 1.4609 96.0294 
 28 1.4165 0.9734 1.4091 96.2011 
 35 1.2521 0.8846 3.1034 94.7599 
Denmark 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 




Notes: Percentage contribution of each structural shock in explaining the historical variance of the interest rate. Second column 










 21 4.5828 12.8570 6.1783 76.3819 
 28 4.0962 11.9689 6.9317 77.0032 
 35 3.7252 10.7195 8.3953 77.1601 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 2.7946 0.5828 0.0523 96.5703 
 21 2.7218 0.5338 0.0561 96.6883 
 28 2.1446 0.5687 0.0749 97.2118 
 35 1.8183 0.4744 0.1286 97.5787 
New Zealand 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.3800 2.2067 0.0842 97.3291 
 21 2.6193 4.9456 0.2682 92.1669 
 28 3.2844 6.7278 0.9271 89.0607 
 35 2.9047 8.1798 0.8928 88.0227 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0012 1.2736 2.3804 96.3449 
 21 3.8067 5.3290 1.5911 89.2732 
 28 6.9816 6.6183 1.2709 85.1292 
 35 6.9270 6.6985 1.1776 85.1969 
Norway 
 
     
Before financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.4541 8.2083 1.8455 89.4921 
 21 6.5984 7.8197 1.0727 84.5092 
 28 6.9614 8.2187 1.5961 83.2239 
 35 5.8471 10.0566 2.7254 81.3710 
After financial crisis 7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 
 14 0.0006 3.2491 1.5982 95.1520 
 21 4.5300 1.9715 1.4977 92.0008 
 28 4.1444 2.4073 2.2159 91.2324 




Table 10: Variance decompositions - A comparison through covariance metrics 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel 1: 3-month interest rates 
High debt vs low debt countries: ΣCov(high debt)/ΣCov(low debt) = 13.894 
 
Before and after the financial crisis and low debt countries:  
ΣCov(before the crisis)/ΣCov(after the crisis) = -10.426 
 
Before and after the financial crisis and high debt countries:  
ΣCov(before the crisis)/ΣCov(after the crisis) = 17.731 
 
Panel 2: 5-year interest rates 
High debt vs low debt countries: ΣCov(high debt)/ΣCov(low debt) = 18.509 
 
Before and after the financial crisis and low debt countries:  
ΣCov(before the crisis)/ΣCov(after the crisis) = -13.614 
 
Before and after the financial crisis and high debt countries:  
ΣCov(before the crisis)/ΣCov(after the crisis) = 19.246 
 
Panel 3: 10-year interest rates 
High debt vs low debt countries: ΣCov(high debt)/ΣCov(low debt) = 22.935 
 
Before and after the financial crisis and low debt countries:  





Before and after the financial crisis and high debt countries:  
ΣCov(before the crisis)/ΣCov(after the crisis) = 24.705 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The numbers denote the sum of covariance terms, where each term is normalized by the variance of interest rates innovation. 
 
 
